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We provide an explanation for multi-sourcing, which is often found in the real world and refers to the 
situation where a final goods producer acquires homogenous components from different suppliers. In the 
presence of imitation under outsourcing, multi-sourcing helps to deter entry by the suppliers into the 
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 Non-Technical Summary  
Empirical evidence suggests that a firm often procures homogenous products from different suppliers. 
While a great deal of attention has been paid to show the rationale and the effects of international 
outsourcing, the multi-sourcing activity, which refers to the situation where a final goods producer acquires 
homogenous components from different suppliers, did not get much attention. We show that, in the 
presence of knowledge transfer and imitation under outsourcing, multi-sourcing helps to protect the 
outsourcing firm by eliminating the suppliers’ incentive for entry in the final goods market. Thus, multi-
sourcing acts as an entry deterrence strategy. 
   1
1. Introduction 
Empirical evidence suggests that a firm often procures homogenous products from 
different suppliers. For example, Mattel, a premier toy brand based in the US, 
purchases from a large number of third-party manufacturers across countries such as 
the US, Mexico, Brazil, Asia (including China and India), New Zealand, and 
Australia. Motorola, a leading technology firm in communication, relies heavily on 
component suppliers including Toppoly Optoelectronics Corp., Silitek and Compeq 
Manufacturing. It is reported that Motorola, in 2008, will outsource 75 million to 80 
million handsets to original design manufacturers (ODMs), with more than 50 million 
devices outsourced to Compal Communications and the remainder contracted to Chi 
Mei Communications System (DigiTimes, 2007). Other examples abound. 
While a great deal of attention has been paid to show the rationale and the 
effects of international outsourcing,
1 the multi-sourcing activity, which refers to the 
situation where a final goods producer acquires homogenous components from 
different suppliers, did not get much attention. We show that, in the presence of 
knowledge transfer and imitation under outsourcing, multi-sourcing helps to protect 
the outsourcing firm by eliminating the suppliers’ incentive for entry in the final 
goods market. Thus, multi-sourcing acts as an entry deterrence strategy. Two 
important ingredients of our analysis, viz., knowledge transfer and imitation under 
outsourcing, are well documented in the literature (see, e.g., Pack and Saggi, 2001). It 
is often the case that a buyer needs to transfer detail production knowledge to the 
suppliers, which can imitate the technology and create the threat of competition in the 
buyer’s markets.  
                                                      
1 See, Glass and Saggi (2001), Pack and Saggi (2001),Grossman and Helpman (2002 and 2003), Shy 
and Stenbacka (2003), Antràs and Helpman (2004), Jones (2005) and Marjit and Mukherjee (2008) for 
some recent works on outsourcing.   2
Our reason for multi-sourcing is different from the hold-up problem 
highlighted in the property-right literature (Grossman and Hart, 1986). It may also 
worth mentioning that, in contrast to Pack and Saggi (2001), where double 
marginalization, due to a linear pricing under outsourcing, creates the incentive for 
multi-sourcing, the non-linear payment schemes in our analysis eliminate double 
marginalization under outsourcing. 
 
2. Outsourcing to a single firm 
Consider a two-period model of a world economy with two countries, called country 
A and country B . Assume that, at the beginning of period 1, there is a firm, called 
firm  a,  in country  A, who owns a technology for a particular product. Firm a can 
produce the product at the constant marginal cost m c , thus earning  ) ( m
t
a c π  in each 
period  t by selling the product in the world market, where t = 1, 2. We assume same 
demand for the product in both periods. Hence, the total profit of firm a is 







a c c π π ∑
=
= . For simplicity, we do not discount future profits. 
Assume that there is a firm, called firm b , in country B , who does not have 
the technology to produce the product, yet, given the technology, is able to produce 
the product at the constant marginal cost  b c , with  b m c c > , where  0 = b c , for 
simplicity. Hence, firm B enjoys a lower cost of production, which creates the 
incentive for outsourcing by firm a. 
If firm b produces the product, the monopoly profit generated in each period is 
) 0 (
t




a c π π > . We normalize the reservation payoff of firm b  to zero, 
for simplicity. Hence, firm a can outsource the product to firm b against a fee of   3
) 0 (
t
a π  to be paid in each period. We assume that firm a gets the payment separately in 
each period. Financial constraint faced by firm b may justify this assumption.  
So far, we did not consider imitation by the supplier, which is firm b. In the 
absence of imitation by the supplier, it is optimal for firm a to outsource production 
to firm b  against a per-period payment of  ) 0 (
t
a π . In this situation, the total profit of 






a π π ∑
=
= , and there is no need for multi-sourcing in this 
benchmark case of no imitation. Hence, our analysis differs from Pack and Saggi 
(2001), where the outsourcing firm cannot extract the entire surplus from outsourcing, 
and the incentive for multiple-sourcing remains under no imitation by the supplier. 
Let us now consider imitation by the supplier. We assume that firm b requires 
one period to imitate the technology of firm a if firm a outsources to firm b . After 
imitation, firm b  can compete with firm a with a homogeneous product. However, 
firm b needs to incur an entry cost I , if it enters the market.  
We consider the following game. At the beginning of period 1, firm a offers 
an outsourcing contract to firm b specifying the payments for periods 1 and 2, should 
firm b uses the technology of firm a. Firm b decides whether or not to accept the 
offer. If firm b accepts the offer, it produces the product by using firm a’s technology, 
and makes the payment to firm a after period 1. Since firm b imitates the technology 
during period 1, at the beginning of period 2, it decides whether or not to enter the 
product-market (and breaks the contract with firm a).
2 Firm b  enters the market if its 
net profit is higher under entry than no-entry and continuing the contract with firm a. 
                                                      
2 For simplicity, we normalize the cost of breaking up a contract to zero. If there is a cost of breaking 
up the contract, given the possibility of imitation, firm b can always contract with firm a  separately in 
each period, if the cost of contracting (which is also normalized to zero in our analysis, for simplicity) 
is not very high.   4
If firm b rejects firm a’s offer in period 1, firm a produces the product and earns 
profit accordingly.
3 We solve the game through backward induction. 
Under imitation by firm b , the threat of competition restricts profit extraction 
by firm a. Hence, while offering the contract at the beginning of period 1, firm a 
needs to offer a period-specific contract which discourages firm b from entering the 
market, since competition in the product market reduces the industry profit and the 
profit of firm a.  
Let us first determine the profit of firm b  in period 2, when it produces with 
firm a’s technology in period 1 but competes with firm a in period 2. The net profits 
of firms a and b in period 2 are respectively  ) 0 , (
2
m a c π and 0 ) 0 , (
2 > − I cm b π . The first 
(second) argument in  ) 0 , (
2
m i c π , i = a, b, shows the marginal cost of firm a (firm b ). 
Hence, in order to prevent firm b from entering the market, the outsourcing contract 
should leave firm b with a positive profit of  I cm b − ) 0 , (
2 π . Therefore, the price paid 
by firm b in period 2 should not exceed  ) ) 0 , ( ( ) 0 (
2 1 I cm b a − − π π .  Note that 
) 0 , ( ) 0 , ( ) 0 (
2 2 1
m a m b a c c π π π > − , i.e., the gross industry profit (which includes the entry-
cost) is higher under monopoly than under duopoly, and this is always true for 
homogeneous products.  
Since there is no imitation in period 1, the payment under outsourcing for 
period 1 would be  ) 0 (
1
a π .  The profits of firms a and b in period 1 only are 
respectively ) 0 (
1
a π  and 0 . 
Therefore, at the beginning of period 1, firm a offers a contract specifying that 
firm b pays  ) 0 (
1
a π  and  I cm b a + − ) 0 , ( ) 0 (
2 1 π π  in periods 1 and 2, respectively. Note 
                                                      
3 Since imitation is not a credible threat if the offer is given in period 2, and because firm a  can extract 
the entire profit generated in firm b , if firm b  rejects the offer in period 1, there is no reason for it to 
accept an offer in period 2. Hence, if the offer in period 1 is rejected, there is no offer in period 2.   5
that firm b cannot be better off either by rejecting this offer in period 1 or by 
cancelling the contract in period 2 and entering the product market. The total net 
profits of firms a and b  are respectively  I cm b a + − ) 0 , ( ) 0 ( 2
2 1 π π  and  I cm b − ) 0 , (
2 π .  
  It must be noted that, since imitation requires one period, firm a may want to 
outsource only in period 2. In this situation, firm a earns a total profit of 
) 0 ( ) (
2 1
a m a c π π + , while the total profit of firm b is zero. However, outsourcing at the 
beginning of period 1 dominates deferred-outsourcing if  
) ( ) 0 , ( ) 0 (
1 2 1
m a m b a c c I π π π + > + .        ( 1 )  
Whether firm a outsources in period 1 or in period 2, in the presence of imitation by 
firm b, the total profit of firm a under outsourcing is lower compared to the situation 
of no imitation by firm b.  
 
3. Outsourcing to multiple firms 
Now assume that firm a decides to outsource in period 1, but, instead of outsourcing 
to firm b only, it outsources to two symmetric firms, b and c. Neither b nor c has the 
technology to produce the product of firma, but both of them are able to produce it 
after getting the technology of firm a. Both firms b and c require one period to 
imitate the technology of firm a, and each of them requires the entry-cost I  to enter 
the product-market.  
  We consider the following game. At the beginning of period 1, firm a offers 
period-specific contracts to both firms b  and c, who decide non-cooperatively 
whether or not to accept the contract. If a supplier accepts the offer, it imitates the 
technology during period 1, and decides at the beginning of period 2 whether to enter 
the market or to continue with firm a’s contract. If both firms b and c have accepted   6
the offer, they take the market-entry decision in period 2 simultaneously and non-
cooperatively. If either firm b  or firm c rejects the offer of firm a at the beginning 
of period 1, only the firm who is accepting the offer takes the market-entry decision in 
period 2. We solve the game by through backward induction. 
     
Proposition 1: If  ) 0 , 0 , ( ) 0 , 0 , ( ) 0 , 0 ( ) 0 , 0 (
1 1 1 1
m c m b c b c c I π π π π = > > = ,
4 firm  a offers 
the following contract to both firms b and c at the beginning of period 1: in both 
periods 1 and 2, each of firms b  and c produces one half of the monopoly output 
corresponding to zero marginal cost, and each of them pays  2 / ) 0 (
t
i π , i = b, c, to firm 
a. 
5 Both firms b  and c accept this contract.   
Proof: See Appendix A. 
 
Intuitively, under multi-sourcing, if the market size and the entry-cost are such 
that the net profits of the suppliers are negative when both of them enter the market in 
period 2, it creates a coordination problem between the suppliers. Hence, each of them 
randomizes the entry decision, and the net expected equilibrium profit of each 
supplier is the same under entry and under no-entry. Thus, even if outsourcing creates 
knowledge spillover, multi-sourcing prevents entry of the suppliers by creating 
competition between them, and helps to protect the market of the outsourcing firm 
from the suppliers. 
If the condition in Proposition 1 holds, the profit of firm a under multi-
sourcing is the same to that of under no imitation.  
                                                      
4 The arguments  m c , 0, and 0 in 
1
i π , i = b, c, represents the marginal cost of firms a, b, and c, 
respectively. 




i π π =  where i, j = b, c, and  j i ≠ .   7
If the condition in Proposition 1 does not hold but there are large number of 
potential suppliers, given the market size and the entry-cost, firm a can choose the 
number of suppliers suitably so that, in the entry game of period 2, the expected 
equilibrium payoff of each supplier becomes zero, which is the profit of a supplier 
under no-entry. Hence, by reducing the gross profit of the suppliers, multi-sourcing 
protects the market of the outsourcing firm by deterring entry of the suppliers.  
 
4. Conclusion 
There are ample evidences of multi-sourcing, yet the theoretical literature did not pay 
much attention to this issue. We provide a strategic reason for multi-sourcing. We 
show that, in the presence of imitation under outsourcing, multi-sourcing acts as an 
entry deterrence strategy by creating an entry game between the suppliers, thus 
helping the outsourcing firm to extract more profits compared to the case of single 
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Appendix 
A  Proof of Proposition 1: At the beginning of period 2, firms b and c decide 
simultaneously whether or not to enter the market. The entry-game between firms b 
and c generates the payoff functions shown in Table 1. In Table 1, the strategies of 
firms b and c are characterized by E (i.e., entry and breaking the contract with firm a) 
and NE (i.e., no-entry and continuing the contract with firm a). 
 
Table 1. Payoffs to firms b and c in period 2  
           Firm c 
   E NE 
Firm b  E  ( I cm b − ) 0 , 0 , (
2 π , I cm c − ) 0 , 0 , (
2 π )( I b − ) 0 , 0 (
2 π , 0 ) 
  NE  (0 ,  I c − ) 0 , 0 (
2 π )  (0 , 0 ) 
  
Assume that firms b and c enter (resp. do not enter) the market with 
probabilities  b p  and  c p  (resp.  ) 1 ( b p −  and  ) 1 ( c p − ), respectively.  The expected 
payoff of firm b under entry is 
) ) 0 , 0 ( )( 1 ( ) ) 0 , 0 , ( (
1 1 I p I c p b c m b c − − + − π π ,                (A1) 
and its profit is zero if it does not enter the market. Letting (A1) equals to zero, the 
equilibrium value of  3 p  is given by   
) 0 , 0 , ( ) 0 , 0 (












= ,                    (A2) 
where ) 1 , 0 ( ∈ c p  for  ) 0 , 0 , ( ) 0 , 0 , ( ) 0 , 0 ( ) 0 , 0 (
1 1 1 1
m c m b c b c c I π π π π = > > = . 
Similarly, we obtain the equilibrium values of  b p  as    9
) 0 , 0 , ( ) 0 , 0 (












= ,                    (A3) 
where ) 1 , 0 ( ∈ c p  for  ) 0 , 0 , ( ) 0 , 0 , ( ) 0 , 0 ( ) 0 , 0 (
1 1 1 1
m c m b c b c c I π π π π = > > = . 
It follows from (A2) and (A3) that, if 
) 0 , 0 , ( ) 0 , 0 , ( ) 0 , 0 ( ) 0 , 0 (
1 1 1 1
m c m b c b c c I π π π π = > > = , the expected payoffs of firms b 
and c in period 2 are 
   0 ) ) 0 , 0 ( )( 1 ( ) ) 0 , 0 , ( ( ) (
1 1 2 = − − + − I p p I c p b b b m b b π π ,           (A4) 
and neither firm b nor firm c is better off by breaking up the contract with firm a and 
entering the market. Since, both firms b  and c produce for firm a in both periods, it 
is optimal for firm a to ask each of them to produce one half of the monopoly output 
corresponding to zero marginal cost, and to pay  2 / ) 0 (
t
i π , i = b, c, to firm a. This 
contract is accepted by both firms b  and c, since neither of them can be better off by 
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